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I n her V.oluminous published diaries Anals Nin somew.hererelates how her psychoanalyst Otto Rank Once stated "Allmorallty is but aesthetics", Although such a ccntentlOD
would be enough to make most theologians and philosophers
fall off their chairs, the idea that the aesthetic sense may in fact
constitute a fundamental category of human experience rather
than merely be attendant upon 'higher' faculties, is a notion
worthy of some consideration. Ernst Mach, one of the early 20th
century founders of quantum mechanics, went as far as to
suggest that scientific theories are not so much increasingly
close approximations to reality, as they are insights into the
psychology of the scientists who produced them. Together these
two contentions suggest that the aesthetic sense plays a greater
role in the cultural and scientific descriptions of our world than
is usually acknowledged.
Such a proposition may seem counterintuitive, given that
since the beginning of the Modern era one of the most
staunchly defended diVides has been that which is said to
separate the aesthetic and the scientific fields of endeavour.
Indeed, upon the creation of the Royal Society in the late 17th
century, certain categories of expression were explicitly excised
from the society's language: any writings that smacked of the
poetic or that relied on overly metaphorical formulations were
rejected as being illegitimate modes of scientific discourse. An
attentive study of the history of the subsequent scientific project
reveals however that this prohibition is almost constantly
forgotten, and that many of the most important scientific
concepts are underpinned by unquestionably aesthetic
considerations.
Most historians consider that the 19th century Industrial
Revolution evolved in two stages: the first phase was associated
with the industrial application of the steam engine and heavy
machinery, and the subsequent phase was associated with
electrification. (It transformed Paris, for instance, into the Vl11e
Lumiere or 'City of Light' in the 1880s.) In broader and more
inclusive terms however, one may characterise this period as the
Thermodynamic Age. It was an age dominated by the emerging
discourse about 'energy' that was given birth by Sadi Carnot's
explanation of the theoretical implications of the steam engine
and culminated in the three laws of thermodynamics. In the
middle of the 20th century this age would subsequently yield to
its natural heir, the Atomic Age, itself beholden to Albert
Einstem's brilliant reconceptualisation of the ldea of energy.
Just as surely, this latter age transformed into that which we are
now experiencmg: the Digital Age. While these eras are of
course simply heuristic devices, I would suggest that they are
nonetheless useful, and every bit as meaningful (and similarly
fraught with difficulties) as the terms Middle Ages or
Renaissance.
One of the characteristics of these eras and the aesthetic
transformations they encapsulate is the emergence of key
imaginaries that define the dominant metaphors and cultural
forms of a given period. The thing that distinguishes a particular
imaginary from the imagination in general is that it is
constituted by a limited set of specific objects that are
associated with an abstract idea. For example, the imaginary
that has grown around the idea of 'god' has a particular set of
figuratlOns that differs significantly from those that have grown
around the idea of 'the machine', And, of course, the
imaginanes of both god and the machine differ greatly
depending on whether one is examining them in a Western
European, South East Asian or Pacific context.
When I speak of an imaginary I not only intend the set of
attendant images but also the cognitive practices that are
generated by and support those images. For example, the
cultural and scientific discourse about thermodynamic 'energy'
that was first generated by the industrial applications of Watt's
steam engine represents the complex imaginative extension of
the simple idea of 'heat transfer'.
The key to understanding these transformations in
imaginaries is in each case a machine. In the Thermodynamic
Age it is the steam engine, in the Atomic Age it is the fiSSlOn
bomb, and in the Digltal Age it is the computer. Each of these
machines was the occasion for the generation of a complex of
images, ideas and metaphors that contribute to the imaginary of
each age. In the Thermodynamic Age the paintings of Seurat
and the pointillists echoed the worldview of the thermodynamic
atomists, and Seurat himself was strongly influenced by the
theories of perception put forward by one of the key figures in
the discourse surrounding thermodynamics, Hermann van
HeImholtz. In the early 20th century Bertrand Russell
p'ropounded his philosophy of logical atomism at the same time
as the industrial machine was becoming a metaphor for all
things human. In Eugene O'Neill's expressionistic play D)mamo,
in the photographs of industrial machines in situ by Charles
Sheeler and in the paintings of strange devices by Duchamp
and Leger the machine became other than itself For Sigmund
Freud the thermodynamic concept of energy was transformed
into the mysterious libido, a concept ultimately reliant upon
metaphors drawn from the ideas of a series of 19th-century
thinkers who successively elaborated the concept of the transfer
of heat from one body to another.
The steam engine with its pumps and pistons, levers and
gears was the mechanical equivalent of muscle and bone, of the
palpable application of energy and labour. Industrial machines
were the epitome of materialism in both its scientific and social
aspects. This was to change irrevocably when, in 1945, John
Van Neumann set his ENIAC computer to the task of working
on physics equations in relationship to the development of the
first atomic bomb. Not long after the world learnt of the
bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and people were inevitably
confronted with the mysterious, evanescent nature of things,
Einstein's vision of reality as the product of the curvature of
space-time, of the sub·atomic constituents of matter as being
an infinite but closed field of post-Newtonian forces, had
suddenly and horrifyingly become concrete. In the Atomic Age
the concept of matter as the stuff that one could see and touch,
that was palpable and 'massy', had all but disappeared as a
result of the fact of atomic fission - or at any rate had become
so rarefied that the words used in physical descriptions acquired
_a considerable ambiguity.,.ThisJracturipg_of_matteUl,Jld_th.e'- _
recognition of the mysterious nature of the matter--energy
exchange can be found reflected in many of Pollock's paintings,
which seemingly echo the chaotic traceries and quantum jumps
of sub-atomic particles in a particle accelerator. Mark Rothko
began painting his folding, shifting fields of colour soon after
the first atomic test, capturing perhaps the coruscating and
fleeting nature of reality in the face of the fission bomb. Sartre
and Camus grappled with the absurdity of existence when
confronted with reality as the mechanical mteraction of random
particles and the immanent threat of nuclear atomisation.
Geneticist Jacques Monad applied the absurdism of random
interactions to the chromosome string, and threw up his hands
in despair with the title of his book, Chance and NecesSity.
With the creation of Van Neumann's ENIAC computer, the
concept of a machine powered by the transformation of
mechanical energy - thermodynamic, hydraulic, piston power -
was superceded by the mysterious, immaterial nature of the
transformation of information. It is the computer that is central
to the shift from the aesthetic of the Atomic Age to that of the
Digital Age.
Even though a computer is undoubtedly a material object,
its function, its meaning as an object, lies within the realm of
ideas, Paralleling the ghostly cogito of Descartes, it is this
invisibility of its functioning - the transformation of information
that defines it - that distinguishes the essence of the computer
from anyone of its particulBl physical manifestations. From its
earliest beginnings as a clunky analogue calculating device, the
modern computer is now enVlsioned as a virtual simulacrum, an
object the functions of which seem to occupy the liminal region
between the physical and the intellectual, Contemporary
mathematical physicist Frank: Tlpler describes the computer as
an exact emulation of an ideal universal computer:
An emulation is an exact simulation, an absolutely perfect
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copy. Everybody's computer emulates other computers,
although the average person is not aware of that. In any
running computer there are several computers there. All but
one of them are virtual computers, perfect imitations of other
computers. Writing commands into your machine, you see the
physical machine, but in reality an emulation of another
computer exists inside thls machine. But it only exists as bits
of information. J --
This constellation of ideas contributes to the latest
modifications to the imaginary of the machine and consolidates
the shift from the aesthetic of the Atomic Age to that of the
Digital Age. At the core of the digital aesthetic is the notion that
everything is reducible to a calculation utilising binary integers
and, more importantly, that there is a formal beauty to this
calculating that transcends the object of the calculation.
After emerging from a virtual reality environment, Michael
Heim, self-described proponent of 'Heidegger Lite' philosophy,
noted:
Reality afterwards seems_hidden underneath a thin film of
appearance. Your perceptions seem to float over a darker,
unknowable truth. The world vibrates with the finest of
tensions, as if something big were imminent, as if you were
about to break through the film of illusion. 2
used for much academic computing, self-published a 1,280-page
tome entitled A New Kind of Science. For over ten years Wolfram
has been studying cellular automata - simple computer
programs that generate self-replicating, and therefore lifelike,
'digital organisms' - and he is convinced that these computer·
generated graphics essentially model the workings of the
environment. Even the simplest algorithms can reproduce
structures commonly observed in the 'real' world - the
branching structure of the lungs, the forking branches of a tree,
cloud patterns or the spots on a leopard, for example. Wolfram
suggests that just as with his cellular automata, the complexity
observed in the natura1 world is the result of the iterations of
simple algorithms.
The digital aesthetic displays an overriding obsession with
the replication of natural form, and in this it paradoxically
demonstrates a return to a key concern of artists during the
Renaissance: verisimilitude. Contemporary computers can
simulate practically anything, to such an extent that it is
becoming increasingly difficult to immediately distinguish
between that which is 'real' and its simulation. Verisimilitude
has become the holy grail of the Digital Age. Observing many
contemporary computer games, the exactitude of their visual
and audio elements makes identification of an actual car race
broadcast on television as distinct from its Playstation or XBox
equivalent a difficult proposition to the casual observer. The
The crepuscular truth is the 'digital reality' that undergirds
the world of appearances: like the Buddhist notion of the
experiential world as the play of illusion, SBInsara, for Heim
and like·minded thinkers om everyday world hides something
greater and more essential beneath it. As much of his
inspiration derives from the 1960s, it is not surprising that he
often likes to quote Jim Mortison of The Doors:
We have been metamOIphosed from a mad body dancing on
hillsides to a pair of eyes staring in the dark. 3
The human predilection for the visual so bemoaned by a
series of thinkers in the 1970s and after - Foucault, Baudrillard
and the contributors to Screen magazine come immediately to
mind - here becomes a metaphysical principle: reality construed
as the dance of phosphor dots playing on our retina, the theatre
of the world becoming a program generated by a umversal
computer
This notion that reality is the product of digital calculation is
taken very seriously by several contemporary thinkers working
withm the digital aesthetic. In his book Three Scientists and
Their Gods, Robert Wright describes the vision of contemporary
computer engineer Ed Fi:edkin who beheves that reality itself lS
digital: the universe is an infinite computer calculating eternity
and all that it contains. Recently Stephen Wolfram, a
mathematician and the designer of Mathematica, the software
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ubiquity of CGI (computer gate interface) visual effects in
contemporary cinema makes identification of 'real' locations
and events as opposed to their computer-generated cousins an
increasingly pointless task
The idea of a machine that could simulate any other
machine was a central concern of one of the key figures in the
development of the modern computer, Alan 'I\.I.ri.ng. Thring's
ideal machine was a 'universal computer', universal because it
could in principle replicate the functioning of any other
machine. The dream of the Thring machine was that of the
ultimate machine. As the Digital Age develops, the computer
has indeed come to be seen as this final machine: not only can
any machine be simulated, but also anything at all can be
replicated. If virtual reality environments develop beyond the
present clunky, head-mounted displays, perhaps even the
experiential world itself may be effectively simulated.
This digital imaginary - the imaginary that encompasses a
world constructed of binary digits and the final machine - is
presently so powerful that it is difficult to imagine how it mlght
be superceded. Yet the fact that science uses mathematics as its
system of representation, and therefore necessarily proceeds by
an analysis of quantities rather than qualities, is entirely
contingent upon historical factors. Science, and therefore the
wider culture wlthm which sClentists work, does not have to
proceed in this manner. But mathematics lS such an important
-'.' ..'. ",
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nature of things.
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Frank 'I\pplel quoted in an mterview with Anthony Liversidge
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symbol of our transition to modernity that a time when Western outcome is always determined by an algorithm. and all
culture might adopt a new manner of scientific representation algOrithms must have a strictly determinable outcome. For
may have passed forever. people like Fredkin and Wolfram this forces on them the belief
There are perhaps two challenges to the digital aesthetic that there is no true randomness in the universe either: chance
and its attendant imaginary. Both of these challenges, if is just an illusion thrown up by the universal computer, and with
effected, would produce radical imaginaries of their own. The access to the code, road deaths, earthquakes and the whorls on
first challenge is the natural heir to the Digital Age, and again is your fmgertips would all be seen as the result of a strict order of
centred on a new kind of machine: the development of an AI or calculation. Yet if they are wrong, if objective chance is a
Artificial Intelligence that passes the 'furing test. Simply put, fundamental aspect of the way things are, then the idea of the
this test would validate the fact that an artificially created world as calculation can only go so far and the analogy of
intelligence was capable of fooling a human being that it was universe as computer breaks down at a fundamental level.
another human being rather than a machine. The intellectual At the moment the search for ever-increasing accuracy in
level of the AI is not the point - it could have the mind of a simulation across the scientific and cultural fields will lead the
three-year~oldor the intellectual capacity of Derrida - it simply digital aesthetic towards an inevitable period when real events
has to fool most people that it is a human being. and digital events become impossible to distinguish. The idea of
If this was to come about, the ramifications of the era in eyber doubles, StBI llek's 'holodeck' and vutual worlds have
which AIs are a permanent part of our culturaIlife would be already expanded and deepened the digital imaginary. What lies
profound. We would be confronted with a number of fascinating beyond the Digital Age will, perhaps, be determined by minds
scenarios: what would happen to art photography or installation that see things in a completely different way - or the universe
art or art practice itself when an AI begins to enter the gallery itself may be revealed as much greater than the grandest of
scene? How would the M1V awards and cmema be transformed calculations, and a new imaginary will respond to this as yet
when an AI creates its own music/music video/feaiure film? _._- -- -unlmaginabie wor1cCView.
How would the world be represented by an AI? The implications
of a non-human imaginary could be thrilling, if somewhat
frightening.
If an PJ never eventuates, then perhaps it will be because of
the second possible challenge to the digital aesthetic. This
challenge is what the surrealist theoreticians called 'objective
chance'. There is no true randomness in any algorithmically
generated event. Even though computers often rely on a random
number generator to accomplish a task, this sub-routine can
only produce a pseUdo-random number because. ultimately, the
